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I. INTRODUCTION
While regularly seeking to apply international human rights norms tojudge
the behavior of other governments, the United States has vehemently rejected
efforts to apply such rules to United States domestic behavior. Variously
described as hypocritical and shortsighted, or pragmatic and morally valid, this
dichotomy is well-ingrained in our legal system. The tensions produced by
United States resistance to domestic application of international law have
heightened in recent years, as the United States seeks to cement its position as
leader of the post-cold war world community and as human rights and
humanitarian law have reached a position of unprecedented importance on the
world stage. Over the course of less than twelve months in 1998 and 1999, the
United States and its European allies fought a war in Kosovo with the avowed
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purpose of forcing a sovereign State' to obey international human rights norms
within its own territorial borders. The sitting head of the State of Yugoslavia
faced indictment by an international criminal tribunal for violations of human
rights and humanitarian law. A former head of the State of Chile fought to
avoid prosecution in Spain for international law violations committed in his
home country. The vast majority of the world's nations endorsed a permanent
International Criminal Court over the vehement objections of the United States.
Each of these international confrontations turned upon the relationship between
international and domestic law. Each demanded examination of the extent to
which international law norms govern the internal domestic actions of a
sovereign State.
A variety of doctrines, briefly summarized in the following section, limit
the application of international norms to events within the United States or to
abuses committed by United States officials. Recent litigation under the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), however, has created a small window through which
international human rights law can be applied both to United States-based
private actors and to United States government officials. As this ATCA
window expands, it challenges traditional barriers to domestic enforcement of
international law. In this paper, after a brief review of the interpretive structure
limiting United States domestic incorporation of international law, I trace the
development of the ATCA doctrine and its expansion to a wider range of
possible defendants. I then analyze the current cases in light of what is known
about the original goals of the statute, concluding that the modem application
of the statute is both constitutional and consistent with the apparent intent of its
framers. Finally, I explore the challenge these cases pose to the traditional
reluctance to enforce international norms within the United States, and the
statute's potential for bringing the United States, kicking and screaming, into
the modem age of international law.
II. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
While actively engaged in international efforts to force governments and
officials of other countries to obey international law, the United States
government has sharply restricted the domestic application of those same rules.
Although scholars continue to debate the interrelationship between international
law and the Constitution, statutes and executive decrees,' courts generally agree
1. I use State, with a capital letter, to indicate the government of an independent nation, and state
to indicate one of the fifty United States.
2. Among the extensive literature, see, e.g., Agora: May the President Violate Customary
International Law?, 80 AM. J. lrL L. 913 (1986) (exchange of views); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board
The Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA.
J. IN'rL L. 1 (1984) (concluding that statutes override inconsistent customary international law); Louis
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that both statutes and executive actions override inconsistent customary
international law, thus enabling either of the political branches to render
unenforceable any international obligation deriving from customary law.3
Treaties receive greater respect within the United States domestic law
structure, being viewed as of equal stature as statutes - the last in time governs
over prior inconsistent provisions -but inferior to the Constitution.' The impact
of treaties, however, is sharply restricted by the view that they are enforceable
only where they explicitly provide for a private right of action,' a condition that
the United States has explicitly attached to several recently ratified human
rights treaties.'
Given this restrictive approach to domestic implementation of international
law within the United States, virtually all such enforcement depends upon the
actions of Congress or the executive branch.7 Congress took such action in
1789 with the enactment of the ATCA, and then again over 200 years later with
the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). These statutes and the cases
applying them provide one of the few judicial arenas in which issues of this
nature are decided. After exploring how the statutes have been applied over
the past twenty years, I will discuss the implications of this line of cases for the
larger issues of domestic application of human rights norms within the United
States.
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH L.REV. 1555, 1561-69(1984) (arguing that
customary international law is "equal in authority to an act of Congress." id. at 1566, but that in some
circumstances, the President is authorized to disregard such law, id. at 1568-69); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and Izternational Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071,
1130-53 (1985) (fundamental international law norms bind both Congress and the President).
3. Although the Supreme Court has never directly decided the place of customary international
law in the hierarchy, its decisions imply that both statutes and executive actions override inconsistent
customary law, and this has been the holding of all modem court decisions. See The Paquete Habana, The
LoLa., 175 U.S. 677,700 (1899) ("where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ... "); id. at 708 (courts
must apply a rule of international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own
government in relation to the matter."); See Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 397-98 (1997).
4. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190
(1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 584 (1884).
5. Id.; See Lobel, supra note 2, at 1108-10 (criticizing the doctrine of "self-executing" treaties).
6. The United States has attached "reservations, understandings or declarations" to several recently
ratified treaties stating that the treaties create no private right of action, do not effect any changes in United
States law, and do not "federalize" areas otherwise left to the control of the states. See Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 341, 341 (1995)
(discussing the recent attachments to human rights conventions); David P. Stewart, United States Ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1206 (1993).
7. One exception is the enforcement of customary international law norms where there has been
no overriding action from the political branches. See Stephens, supra note 3.
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I. THE UNIQUE AND EVOLVING ROLE OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Given the barriers preventing direct application of most international
human rights law within the United States, one of the few arenas in which inter-
national norms are regularly applied by United States courts are cases arising
under the 200-year-old ATCA8 and its younger cousin, the TVPA, enacted in
1992.9 The ATCA grants federal courts jurisdiction over a claim by an alien
for "a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations." The statute has
been interpreted to allow noncitizens to bring suit for violations of the evolving
body of customary international law norms. The TVPA authorizes a civil suit
by any individual, citizen and noncitizen alike, for two violations, extrajudicial
execution and torture, when committed "under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation."° The TVPA includes detailed definitions
of the two torts that reflect, but do not duplicate, accepted international
standards. "
These two statutes provide the only consistent means by which interna-
tional law claims are adjudicated within the United States, a result of the
explicit authorization of Congress. The constitutionality of the two statutes has
been upheld by every court that has considered the issue. 12 But as litigants
increasingly seek to apply the statutes to domestic conduct, the statutes are
likely to draw increasing scrutiny.
A. Evolving ATCA Claims
The ATCA affords plaintiffs a broad right to file claims for violations of
the evolving body of customary international law. The proper interpretation of
"the law of nations" was a key issue in the first modem ATCA decision,
Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 3 in which the family of a young man tortured to death
in Paraguay sought damages from the police officer who had tortured him. The
defendant argued that international law did not apply to a government's
treatment of its own citizens, relying on prior Second Circuit decisions. The
Fildrtiga court disagreed, holding that "it is clear that courts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (1994).
10. Id., § 2(a).
11. Id. at §§ (a), & (b). See comparison of TVPA definitions with international law norms in BETH
STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 63-68 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1 lth Cir. 1996); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493, 501-03 (9th Cir. 1992); FiIrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Fildrtiga v. Pehia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876.
280
Stephens
the nations of the world today." 4 All courts that have decided the issue have
agreed that the statute refers to current norms of international law, 5 and
Congress has indicated its agreement as well. 6
This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's understanding
of the meaning of the law of nations. In one of the few cases to apply
constitutional language authorizing Congress to "define and punish.., offenses
against the law of nations," for example, the Court held that the clause
encompassed violations of the law of nations as it had evolved, regardless of
whether the particular violation existed at the time the Constitution was
drafted. 7 In Arjona, the defendant was charged with violating a federal statute
making it a crime to counterfeit notes issued by a government-owned foreign
bank.'8 Arjona pointed out that such foreign notes were unknown at the time
the Constitution was drafted. The Court nevertheless found the statute to be
within Congress' constitutional power to "define and punish . . . offenses
against the law of nations" because the law of nations, as used in the Constitu-
tion, encompassed this "more recent custom among bankers of dealing in
foreign securities... " even though the framers would not have contemplated
such an act as a violation of the law of nations.' 9 Similarly, the Court held in
1900 that the law of nations encompassed a newly developed rule of interna-
tional law governing the protection of an enemy's fishing vessels, a rule that
had evolved into a binding norm over the course of the 19th century.20
The Courts' conclusion that the ATCA permits suits for violations of
currently existing international law norms has enabled the courts to recognize
a growing list of violations as triggering ATCA jurisdiction. Fildrtiga and its
progeny require that a norm be "universal, obligatory, and definable."'"
Fildrtiga itself held that torture by a government official of a citizen of his own
state violated international law. Subsequent cases have recognized both
14. Id. at 881.
15. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d at 848; Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
16. See TVPA Legislative Report, H.R. Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, noting that the ATCA permits suits based on "norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law."
17. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
18. Id. at 480-82.
19. Id. at 485-86.
20. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 686,694, the Supreme Court concluded that although the rule
had previously been followed as a matter of comity, it had since ripened into "a settled rule of international
law."
21. This standard, first articulated in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
[hereinafter Forti 1], on reconsideration on other grounds 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988), has since been
widely accepted. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 11, at 51-52; see, e.g.. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,
141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1998); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La.
1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
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additional human rights violations and additional actors as falling within the
reach of the statute. Thus, cases alleging summary execution, disappearance,
arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity have all been found to state claims under
the ATCA.22 Of particular note, one court initially rejected a claim based on
disappearance, but reversed itself based on plaintiff's showing that international
law had recognized such a violation over the preceding decade."
Cases over the past twenty years have also expanded the range of
defendants who can be held accountable under the ATCA. Whereas the
defendant in Fildrtiga was the actual torturer, later suits targeted defendants in
a position of command responsibility: those who planned, ordered, or directed
human rights abuses, or who knew or should have known about the abuses and
failed to prevent their occurrence or punish those responsible.24
B. Private Actors: Individuals and Corporations
In Kadic v. Karadzic,25 the Second Circuit recognized two additional
principles of ATCA jurisprudence as applied to the potential defendants. The
Kadic decision arose out of claims filed against Radovan Karadzic, the leader
of the Bosnian Serbs at the time of the Bosnian war and the head of an
unrecognized de facto state: although based on an illegal seizure of power, his
"government" controlled both territory and population, through a legislature,
executive officers, and a powerful military force. The court first noted that
22. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (slavery); Xuncax, 886
F. Supp. at 185-89 (certain acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment); id. at 173-75 (gender violence
such as rape as a form of torture); Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42 (summary execution, prolonged arbitrary
detention); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) [hereinafter Forti 11] (on
reconsideration) (disappearance). Cases currently pending ask the courts to find gender violence to be an
independent violation of human rights, Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998)
(suit against Islamic fundamentalist group sued for attacks on women and girls), along with egregious
violations of environmental standards, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting issue
but declining to decide whether claim triggered ATCA jurisdiction); Beanal. 969 F. Supp. at 382-84. In
Beanal, the district court held that corporate actions that harm the environment did not violate established
norms of international law. This issue is currently on appeal. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382-84.
23. Cf Ford 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1542-43 (rejecting claim based on disappearance), with Forti I1, 694
F. Supp. at 709-11 (accepting disappearance claim as triggering ATCA jurisdiction).
24. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (holding de facto head of state responsible for abuses
committed by his military forces); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding ex-
dictator of the Philippines responsible for abuses committed by his security forces); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. at 171-73, 174-75 (holding Guatemalan general responsible for violations committed by his forces);
Forti 1, 672 F. Supp. at 1537-38 (holding Argentine general responsible for abuses committed by troops under
his command).
25. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
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certain international human rights norms prohibit private conduct as well as
public acts, and it concluded that the ATCA applies to suits alleging such
violations committed by private parties. In particular, violations such as
genocide and certain war crimes trigger ATCAjurisdiction when committed by
private actors because the international law definitions of those offenses
indicate that the prohibition binds private parties as well as public actors.
26
Second, the Kadic court recognized that human rights violations such as
torture and summary execution, as defined by international law, do require state
action, 7 but held that the requisite "official capacity" could be supplied by an
official of an unrecognized de facto state. The opinion notes that underlying
the state action requirement is a regime's ability to exert official power over
those living under its control, not diplomatic recognition:
[Ilt is likely that the state action concept, where applicable for some
violations like "official" torture, requires. merely the semblance of
official authority. The inquiry, after all, is whether a person purport-
ing to wield official power has exceeded internationally recognized
standards of civilized conduct, not whether statehood in all its formal
28aspects exists.
The decision reflects the Court's willingness to examine the underlying purpose
of modem international human rights law, applying the ATCA in a manner
designed to implement that purpose.
The Kadic court also recognized that the state action requirement may
extend accountability to otherwise private actors who act in complicity with
26. Id. at 239-43. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of December 9, 1948 specifically prohibits genocide whether committed by a public or private actor. 78
U.N.T.S. 277, art. 4. Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, applicable to internal conflicts, is
binding on all parties to a conflict, whether or not they constitute state actors. Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T:
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
27. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 10
December 1984, art. 1, for example, prohibits acts of torture "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." G.A. Res. 39/46,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
28. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. In Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 993 F. Supp. at 9. The district court
recognized that, for the purposes of the state action requirement, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria might
constitute a de facto state in the areas under its control, but withheld determination of that factual issue until
later in the litigation.
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public actors.29 As one district court stated, "it would be a strange tort system
that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who conspired with them
to perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power."3 In defining
the state action requirement in ATCA cases, United States courts have applied
the standards developed in litigation under § 1983, the key United States civil
rights statute that also requires state action.3' The Supreme Court has found
otherwise private action to satisfy the United States state action requirement in
many factual settings, including where a private party performs a public
function; where the state commandeers private parties and assigns them public
responsibilities; where the state and private actions are so interrelated as to be
indistinguishable; and where the private and state parties are engaged in "joint
action. '32 As the Doe v. Unocal court noted, a private party's actions will be
considered state action where the private party "willfully participate[s] in joint
action with the state or its agents;" enters into an agreement with a government
actor; "engages in a conspiracy" or "acts in concert" with state agents; or aids
and abets state agents. 33 The court summarized, "where there is 'a substantial
degree of cooperative action' between the state and private actors in effecting
the deprivation of rights, state action is present.
34
These concepts permit suits against non-governmental groups such as
corporations. Under the same principles applicable to individual private
actors, corporations can be held liable for human rights abuses when they are
29. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
30. Eastman Kodak Comp. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 'To the extent a state action requirement is incorporated into the
ATCA, courts look to the standards developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp.
880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997), citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245. See also Beanal, 969, 375-80 (E.D. La. 1997)
(appeal pending). Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987); TVPA Legislative
Report, H.R. Rep. No. 367, supra note 16.
32. See summaries of this doctrine in Doe 1, 963 F. Supp. at 890-91; National Coalition of
Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345-49 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Beanal, 969
F. Supp. at 376-80.
33. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 890-91.
34. Id. In a related case against Unocal, the same judge found the allegations of state action to be
sufficient where "defendants' challenged actions are allegedly inextricably intertwined with those of the
[Burmese military] government." National Coalition of Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc.,
176 F.R.D. at 349.
35. Similar doctrines permit human rights litigation against unincorporated associations, including
paramilitary groups. For example, the plaintiff in Belance v. Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti,
Civ. No. 94-2619 (E.D.N.Y., filed June 1, 1994), seeks to hold the Front for Advancement and Progress in
Haiti (FRAPH), a terrorist organization, liable for her torture in Haiti. The complaint charges that the
association acted in complicity with the illegal Haitian military regime, and was "present" in New York
because it had opened an office with a representative in New York City. In Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
993 F. Supp. 3 (suit against Islamic fundamentalist group sued for attacks on women and girls), the defendant
association may be held liable as an unincorporated association and/or as a de facto government.
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responsible for violations of international human rights norms that apply to
private actors; or when they act in complicity with government officials to
commit other human rights violations. Thus, a corporation can be held liable
for using slave labor, as alleged in the Doe v. Unocal case,36 or when responsi-
ble for genocide, as alleged in Beanal v. Freeport,3 since both of these
international law prohibitions apply to private actors as well as government
officials. Likewise, corporate actors can be held liable for violations requiring
state action, such as torture and summary execution, when they act in com-
plicity with state actors. As the Beanal court concluded, "a corporation found
to be a state actor can be held responsible for human rights abuses which violate
international customary law. ' 38 Applying the § 1983 civil rights standards,
corporations satisfy the state action requirement when they engage in "joint
action" with a government or government officials, or conspire with or
otherwise act in concert with those officials, or perform a public function, such
as taking responsibility for law enforcement. In a suit against a private
corporation operating a detention facility, for example, a court held that the
defendant corporation and its employees were state actors because they were
"acting under contract" with the United States government and were "perform-
ing governmental services. 39
C. Domestic Applications
Most ATCA cases concern violations occurring abroad, committed by
foreign government officials or foreign citizens, and much of the commentary
on the statute assumes that it is limited to such claims. But the statute in no
way bars claims addressing international law violations within the United-States
or abuses committed by United States citizens or United States government
officials, as long as the defendants are not protected by any applicable
immunities. In the case on behalf of immigrants detained in the United States,
a trial court judge recently upheld the immigrants' right to sue their jailers for
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and other human rights violations.'
The immigration officials had contracted with a private corporation to operate
36. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880.
37. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370-73 (E.D. La. 1997). In Beanal,
however, the district court dismissed plaintiffs third amended complaint, holding that even as amended it
still did not adequately allege genocide, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. March
3, 1998) (unpublished opinion), aff'd on appeal, 197 F.3d 161.
38. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376.
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the facility; the defendants include the corporation, as well as both private
individuals and government officials.
Litigation against the United States government is regulated by the
restrictive Federal Tort Claims Act, which permits such claims for many torts
committed within the United States, but prohibits most claims arising out of
abuses in foreign countries, as well as most of those committed as intentional
acts or in the implementation of discretionary policy decisions.4" It is possible,
however, to sue United States government officials for abuses committed
outside the scope of their authority, or if those acts constitute violations of the
Constitution or specific statutory protections. Thus, United States courts have
refused to dismiss claims against immigration officials for violations of the
rights of detainees4 z and against individual employees of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency accused of responsibility for torture and execution in
Guatemala.43
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE ATCA
The Fildrtiga approach to the ATCA has been remarkably successful on
several fronts. United States courts have followed the precedent in dozens of
cases, producing not a single contradictory holding." Congress has indicated
its agreement with the case and its interpretation of the ATCA, praising the
decision in the legislative reports accompanying the passage of the TVPA.4s
Until very recently, however, almost all of the United States cases have
addressed abuses committed by foreigners in foreign countries. As the targets
of this litigation expand to include United States based corporations as well as
United States government officials, the cases may begin to provoke a more
serious backlash. Thus, it is important to review the constitutional basis for the
statute, and to evaluate whether it will survive increasingly hostile scrutiny, as
41. The Foreign Tort Claims Act and the exceptions to United States government liability are
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2680.
42. Jama, 22 F. Supp.2d at 365.
43. Harbury v. Deutch, Civ. No. 96-00438 (D.D.C. March 9, 2000) (Ordergranting in part/denying.
in part defendants' Motion to Dismiss) (unpublished opinion). In a suit against the City of Los Angeles, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that the ATCA would support a claim against a municipal government for arbitrary
arrest and detention, but found the claim was not supported under the facts. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,
141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1998).
44. Only one judge has written an opinion rejecting Fildrtiga, Judge Bork's concurring opinion in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984); neither of the other judges on
the panel joined his opinion (the case produced three-separate opinions, agreeing only in the result), and no
judge since has adopted Judge Bork's reasoning.
45. The House TVPA Report states that the ATCA has important uses and should not be replaced,
and notes that the Fildrtiga decision "has met with general approval." H.R. Rep. No. 367, supra note 16,
at notes 3, 4.
286
Stephens
the inevitable evolution of the law of nations triggers ATCA litigation under
increasingly controversial circumstances.
A. Federal Foreign Affairs Powers
As with many congressional enactments, the ATCA rests on several
alternative constitutional provisions. All derive to some extent from the
framers' expressed intent to centralize foreign affairs powers in the federal
government.
The roots of the ATCA have been traced to a series of crises during the
period between independence and the ratification of the Constitution, a time
when the Continental Congress struggled ineffectively to govern the loose
federation of independent states.' One of the prime areas of concern was the
Confederation's inability to prevent the states from violating international
obligations. After two incidents in which foreign diplomats were assaulted but
the states failed to act to protect their diplomatic status, Congress twice called
on the states to both prosecute crimes in violation of international law and to
permit civil suits for damages by those injured by such violations. Only one
state, Connecticut, is known to have responded.47 The states' refusal to force
repayment of private debts to the British and their allies - as promised in the
treaty ending the war - threatened to precipitate new hostilities.4 8
Leading participants at the Constitutional Convention described federal
control over foreign affairs as a central objective of the new Constitution. In
particular, they emphasized the need for federal supervision of domestic actions
that might have an impact on foreign relations.49 The violent crimes committed
against diplomats, for example, were of concern not because the underlying
crime - assault and battery - had international implications, but because the
target of the assault brought the crime into the realm of foreign affairs.
Similarly, debt repayment, normally a domestic affair, became a national and
international crisis when such payments were governed by international
commitments.
The Constitutional Convention responded by centralizing foreign affairs
powers in the federal government through a series of clauses granting particular
46. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 402-03.
47. Id.; William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 490-04 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
221, 226-30 (1996).
48. See Dodge, supra note 47, at 236, 254; Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. 180.(1804) ("Until the act of
1793, from the obstacles interposed by juries, and the proceedings of some courts of Virginia, a general
opinion prevailed among the inhabitants of the state of Virginia, and among juries, that a British debt could
not be recovered.").
49. Stephens, supra note 3, at 402-07.
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powers to the federal government and prohibiting the states from exercising
others.5 ° In addition, as the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, certain
foreign affairs powers arise out of the very structure of our government. As
summarized in a case addressing federal authority over immigration, "[flor
local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,
embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation,
one power.' In a later case, the Court relied upon the supremacy of federal
authority over "the general field of foreign affairs," a supremacy to which the
Court has "given continuous recognition., 52 "The Federal Government, repre-
senting as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted
with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign
sovereignties." 3
This federal authority over foreign relations provides support for
congressional power to regulate foreign affairs. In upholding the constitution-
ality of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for example, the Supreme Court
found that Congress has the power to define the circumstances under which
foreign governments can be sued in United States courts.
By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign
relations, Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter
50. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,"
"establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," and "repel Invasions," and "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, while the President is to serve as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States," "make Treaties," with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2,
appoint ambasadors subject to Senate approval, and "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." Id.
at § 3. The states are prohibited from entering into "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;" or granting
"Letters of Marque and Reprisal;" or, without the consent of Congress, "lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage,
keepting] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger
as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONsr. Art. I, § 10.
51. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,606 (1889). See also MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299, 311 (1915), where the court stated, "As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes
of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which
concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."
52. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,62 (1941).
53. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted). This has been the consistent holding of the Supreme Court,
stated most strongly in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), where Justice
Sutherland reasoned, "[Tihe powers of external sovereignty [do] not depend upon the affirmative grants of
the Constitution," but rather are "vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality."
Id. at 318, 325-26. The Constitution, Sutherland concluded, was based upon the "irrefutable postulate that
though the states were several their people in respect of foreign affairs were one." Id. at 317.
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of federal law, whether and under what circumstances foreign nations
should be amenable to suit in the United States. Actions against
foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the
foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy of federal
concerns is evident. To promote these federal interests, Congress
exercised its Article I powers by enacting a statute comprehensively
regulating the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United
States. 4
Similarly, Congress has the power to decide "whether and under what
circumstances" claims alleging violations of international law trigger liability
in United States courts. In the TVPA, a modern Congress defined specific
examples of such liability. In the ATCA, the 18th century Congress delegated
to the courts the task of defining the exact contours of such claims.5
Such delegation was unexceptionable tothe framers, who assumed that
customary international law was a part of the common law of both the states
and of the new federal government.5 6 In our modern, post-Erie world, this
unwritten international law is part of the federal common law, a source of both
supreme federal law, binding on the states, and of federal court jurisdiction. 7
Indeed, the Fildrtiga court rested its analysis of the ATCA in part upon the fact
that customary international law is part of the federal common law, and, as
such, cases alleging violations of such international norms "arise under" federal
law for the purposes of Article III of the Constitution. 8
54. Id. at 493 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court explained that the application of federal
law thus triggered federal court jurisdiction:
The statute must be applied by the District Courts in every action against a foreign
sovereign, since subject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the
existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. At the
threshold of every action in a District Court against a foreign state, therefore, the court
must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions applies - and in doing so it must apply the
detailed federal law standards set forth in the Act. Accordingly, an action against a
foreign sovereign arises under federal law, for purposes of Article HI jurisdiction.
Id. at 493-94 (footnote and citation omitted).
55. "[W]e conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may
fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law." Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996).
56. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 408-13. Debate over this issue continues. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2260 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1824
(1998).
57. Stephens, supra note 3, at 433-53.
58. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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B. The Offenses Clause
The Constitutional Convention also included an apparently noncontrover-
sial clause empowering Congress to "define and punish.., offenses against the
law of nations."59 The first Congress codified several crimes committed against
diplomats as offenses against the law of nations.6° Further criminal codifica-
tion was unnecessary, given that federal courts prosecuted common law crimes
without codification for the first thirty years of the new nation.6' The civil side,
however, was also codified by the first Congress, by including the ATCA as a
section of the First Judiciary Act.62 The language of the ATCA tracts that of
the Constitution, granting federal courts jurisdiction over torts "in violation of
the law of nations," and it is likely that the offenses clause served as an
important piece of constitutional support in the minds of its framers.63
C. The A TCA and the Evolving Law of Nations
Given this constitutional history, the current interpretation of the ATCA
seems both plausible and consistent with the general intentions of the framers.
This is not to say, of course, that any participant in the drafting and ratification
of the statutes foresaw its application, for example, to a claim of genocide
against the leader of a de facto regime in Europe. Such an action was no more
foreseeable in 1791 than was the federal government's power to regulate
interstate commerce conducted by means of the Internet. An attack on the
59. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 10. For a comprehensive discussion of the offenses clause and its
relationship to the ATCA, see Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress' Power to Define
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, __ Wm. & Mary L. Rev. __ (forthcoming Dec.
2000).
60. Diplomatic Relations Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 117-18 (declaring certain acts against
diplomats to be crimes against the law of nations).
61. United States v. Hudson, I I U.S. 32 (1812); see Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101
YALE L. J. 919 (1992) (discussing history of common law crimes and the controversy surrounding the
Supreme Court rejection of the concept).
62. The civil side of the offenses clause has been frequently overlooked. The only commentators
to address the clause have assumed without discussion that it applies only to criminal prosecutions. See
Howard S. Fredman, Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress' International Penal Power, 8 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 279 (1969) (reflecting the criminal limitation in its title, without further discussion); Charles
D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power to "Define... Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 866 (1988) (describing the clause as "permitting Congress to
define violations of customary international law as domestic crimes," also without further discussion
(emphasis added)). Congress, however, cited the clause in support of congressional power to impose civil
liability in enacting both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602-11 (1994), and the
TVPA. As explained in Stephens, Congress is clearly correct in relying on the offenses clause for civil as
well as criminal powers, supra note 59.
63. See Stephens, supra note 59.
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Fildrtiga approach based on supposed unforeseeability is meaningless; most of
the core institutions of our current society were unforeseeable at the time the
Constitution -and the foundational statutes passed by the first Congress - were
enacted.
One recent argument posits that the First Congress intended to create a
cause of action only for claims for which the United States would be held
accountable if it failed to provide redress. Thus, the international law crises
during the Confederation were triggered by attacks on foreign diplomats and by
treaty violations. In such situations, the injured parties looked to the United
States government for satisfaction; when it was not forthcoming, the national
government risked reprisals from the victim's government.
But the language of the ATCA was not restricted to violations of
diplomatic privileges. Instead, Congress chose much more expansive language,
creating remedies for all torts in violation of the law of nations. The plain
meaning of this language is exactly that applied by Fildrtiga: torts that violate
currently existing norms of international law. And the background understand-
ings of the framers, to the extent that we can uncover them, support this
meaning. Indeed, when the offenses clause was adopted at the Constitutional
Convention, authorizing Congress to "define and punish... offenses against
the law of nations," the only recorded opposition addressed the incongruence
of a claim that the United States could "define" the law of nations. "To pretend
to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the Civilized
Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance that would make us
ridiculous."' The framers understood that the world community would take
international law along paths that they could not predict; rather than fixing its
content, they chose a standard that would enable the statute to evolve along
with the law of nations.
Moreover, to the extent that the goal of the statute was to avoid interna-
tional disputes, the drafters chose language that accommodated the reality that
they could not predict what issues would be considered to be of international
concern in the future. In their day, diplomatic protection and treaty violations
were of central concern. Today, issues of trade and human rights are just as
likely to provoke international uproars. Well aware both of the changing nature
of the law of nations and the reality that no one nation could control its
evolution, the framers crafted the ATCA broadly enough to encompass
64. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 614-15 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937). The language was accepted only with the explanation that "define" was intended to suggest the need
to provide detail, not to create offenses where none had previously existed: "The word define is proper when
applied to offenses in this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be a rule." Id. at
615.
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changing notions of international obligations. Interpretation of the ATCA is in
this sense quite simple: it means what it says, as several courts have held.65
V. FEDERALISM AND CONGRESS' POWER TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Congress' power to implement international law rests upon several
constitutional provisions, including the federal structural foreign affairs power,
the federal common law status of customary international law, the power to
"define and punish.., offenses against the law of nations," and the interactions
between each of these and the wide-ranging "necessary and proper" clause.'
How far does the power to implement international obligations extend? Can
Congress enact statutes pursuant to this power that would not otherwise fall
within the federal legislative powers? In particular, what constitutional result
if Congress enacts a statute regulating foreign affairs that infringes into an area
otherwise reserved to the states?
Both the logic of the foreign affairs power and Supreme Court decisions
in analogous areas indicate that Congress can take such actions. Each of the
congressional powers constitutes a specific grant to the federal government of
the authority to regulate activities that fall within its reach; only those powers
that are not assigned to the federal government are reserved to the states. In an
analogous area, the Supreme Court held long ago that congressional power to
implement treaties extends into areas over which Congress could not otherwise
legislate.67 Despite recent criticism, this doctrine remains good law.6"
Similarly, the congressional foreign affairs powers - the structural power
and the enumerated powers, including that contained in the offenses clause -
afford Congress the authority to take any and all actions to implement
international law and regulate foreign relations, as long as such actions do not
violate specific constitutional mandates.
Thus, in Boos v. Barry,69 one of the few cases relying on the offenses
clause, the Supreme Court analyzed congressional statutes barring certain
peaceful protests in the vicinity of foreign embassies.70 The Court found one
65. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), holding that the ATCA "confers
federal subject matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues; (2) for
a tort; (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law)."
66. Particular congressional actions, of course, might also rest upon anyone of the specific
congressional powers, see supra note 50.
67. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 423-33 (1920).
68. See Martin Flaherty, Are We to be A Nation? Federal Power vs. States' Right in Foreign
Affairs, 70 UNIV. COLL. REV. 1277, 1297-1316 (1999).
69. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
70. The case addressed the constitutionality of a statute governing protests within the District of
Columbia, but compared the District of Columbia statute to a similar, but less restrictive statute governing
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statute to violate the First Amendment, noting that "it is well established that
'no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on
any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.' '"71 However, the Court accepted without question Congress'
power to legislate in this area, despite the fact that the federal government
would otherwise have had no power to regulate peaceful political protests.
Noting that "[tihe need to protect diplomats is grounded in our Nation's
important interest in international relations," the Court reviewed efforts to
protect foreign diplomats dating back to the pre-constitutional era of the
Confederation. Indeed, the Court noted that, if anything, the pressing national
interest in diplomatic protection is "even more true today given the global
nature of the economy and the extent to which actions in other parts of the
world affect our own national security."72
Boos v. Barry addressed a statute aimed at protecting diplomats, a
centuries-old topic of international law. But the constitutional analysis would
be no different applied to a modem application of international law. As with
the ATCA, nothing in the Constitution freezes foreign affairs to the areas of
concern they occupied at the time the document was drafted and ratified. In
particular, the available evidence as to the intentions and understandings of the
framers, confirmed by early Supreme Court opinions, indicates that the
Constitution incorporates the assumption that the issues governed international
law necessarily evolve over time.
Consider, for example, the international law provisions governing
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles. Much of the world considers
such executions to be barred by international law; the United States, however,
through reservations to treaties and other objections has attempted to bar the
international norm from applying to United States conduct." In the absence of
such objections, the norm would be binding on the United States, either through
treaty obligations or as a norm of customary international law.74 In such a
situation, failure to obey the prohibition would place the United States in
such protests around the country. The Court noted that Congress had enacted the District of Columbia statute
pursuant to its authority under Article 1, § 8, cl. 10, of the Constitution to "define and punish... offenses
against the Law of Nations." Id. at 321. The Court also referred to the United States treaty obligation to
protect diplomats, contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. Id. at 322.
71. Id. at 324, cited in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
72. Id. at 322.
73. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders, 42 DEPAULU. L. REV. 1311,1328-34(1993); Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment:
The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 655 (1983).
74. Some commentators have argued that United States objections have been ineffective, and that
the norm is already binding within this country. See Hartman, supra note 73.
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violation of its international law obligations, although repercussions from other
members of the world community would likely be limited to criticism, rather
than concrete reprisals. In the absence of domestic incorporation of the
international rule, United States courts would refuse to enforce it, on behalf, for
example, of a person sentenced to death for a crime committed as a juvenile.
But if Congress chose to adopt the norm as binding on the United States,
it would obtain the force of federal law. Congress could constitutionally enact
legislation implementing the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty relying
on the federal foreign affairs power. Such a statute would no more infringe
upon states' rights than the 1790 classification of assaults upon diplomats as
federal crimes, or the more recent federal prohibition of certain acts in the
vicinity of foreign embassies, upheld in Boos v. Barry. In each of these
examples, Congress has the authority to regulate activities that would otherwise
fall within the control of the states because Congress has determined that such
regulation implicates foreign policy concerns. Although the issues of
international importance have changed, congressional power to determine the
content of such issues remains the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem expansion of human rights law to cover private actors is
firmly founded both in 18th century concepts of the evolving law of nations and
in developments in international law over the past fifty years, developments that
the United States has both guided and accepted during that time period. Indeed,
in a world in which private corporations wield more power than most
governments and are increasingly active in areas formerly reserved for
diplomats, it is inevitable that international law must increasingly address the
behavior of both private individuals and private corporations. The acceptance
of norms governing private actors into international law reflects a new
international consensus that such issues are of international concern, that they
affect international relations.
Similarly, international law recognizes no exceptions either for United
States government officials acting abroad, or for the actions of the United States
government within our borders. It is time for the United States to accept this
reality and to bring the nation into compliance with international obligations.
ATCA litigation has opened a window for litigating such issues in United States
courts; the opening must be strengthened and enlarged if the United States
wishes to be recognized as a law-abiding member of the world community.
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